

# NETWORK SECURITY EVALUATION BASED ON SIMULATION OF MALFACTOR'S BEHAVIOR

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Abstract: The approach to computer network security analysis intended for using both at design and exploitation stages is suggested. This approach is based on simulation of malefactor's behavior, generating common attack graphs and calculating different security metrics. The graph represents possible attack scenarios taking into account network configuration, security policy, malefactor's locations, knowledge level and strategy. The security metrics describe computer network security at different levels of detail and take into account various aspects of security. Attack scenarios model, common attack graph building procedures, used security metrics, and general security level evaluation are defined. The implemented version of the security analysis system is described, and examples of express-evaluations of security level are considered.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Malefactors can use different vulnerabilities and bottlenecks of network configuration and security policy and perform various penetration strategies. These strategies are directed to different network resources and include a great number of assault actions chains. Malefactors can step-by-step compromise network hosts and realize diverse security threats.

Therefore, during computer network design and maintenance, designer or administrator should *check whether network configuration parameters and security procedures provide necessary security level*. Moreover, at exploitation stage, the configuration of computer networks can be changed, and it is also necessary to perform network monitoring, analyze available vulnerabilities and evaluate security level.

At design stage the specifications of network configuration and security policies are the main input for security analysis. At exploitation stage the main input are the actual parameters of network configuration and security policy.

The complexity of computer network security management causes the necessity to develop powerful *automated security analysis systems*. These systems should allow to find and correct errors in network configuration, reveal possible assault actions for different security threats, determine

critical network resources and choose effective security policy appropriate to threats.

At *design stages*, different approaches to security analysis and evaluation of general security level can be used, for example, based on qualitative and quantitative techniques of risk analysis. We think the perspective directions in evaluating security of large-scaled networks consist in simulating possible malefactor's actions, building the representation of these actions as attack graphs, the subsequent checking of various properties of these graphs, and determining security metrics which can explain possible ways to increase network security level.

At *exploitation stages*, passive and active methods of vulnerability assessment are used. The passive methods do not allow estimating the possible routes of malefactor's penetration. The active methods can not be applied in all situations, as lead to operability violation of network services or the system as a whole. The combination of passive obtaining appropriate data about network configuration and security policy, attack modeling and simulation, attack graph construction, and automatic reasoning can be satisfactory approach to solve these problems.

There are a lot of papers which consider different approaches to security analysis. For example, various methods for representing attack scenarios are used: attack trees (Schneier, 1999), formal grammars (Gorodetski, Kotenko, 2002), cause-effect

model of attacks (Cohen, 1999), etc. (Ritchey, Ammann, 2000) proposes model checking technique for network vulnerability analysis. (Jha, Sheyner, Wing, 2002) suggests the technique of attack graph evaluation based on model checking, Bayesian and probabilistic analysis. (Sheyner, Haines, Jha, etc., 2002) presents algorithms for generating scenario graphs based on symbolic and explicit-state model checking. These algorithms ensure producing counterexamples for determining safety and liveness properties. (Rothmaier, Krumm, 2005) proposes an approach for analyzing different attack scenarios. The approach is based on high-level specification language, a translation from this language to the constructs of model checker SPIN, applying optimization techniques and model checking for automated attack scenario analysis. In (Lye, Wing, 2005) the game theory based method of evaluating security is suggested. The authors view the interactions between an attacker and the administrator as a two-player stochastic game and construct the game model. (Hariri, Qu, Dharmagadda, etc., 2003) describes global metrics which can be used to analyze and proactively manage the effects of complex network faults and attacks, and recover accordingly. (Rieke, 2004) offers a methodology and a tool for vulnerability analysis which can automatically compute possible attack paths and verify some security properties. (Dantu, Loper, Kolan, 2004) proposes approach to estimate the risk level of critical network resources using behavior based attack graphs and Bayesian technique. (Ou, Govindavajhala, Appel, 2005) suggests the logic programming approach to automatically fulfill network vulnerability analysis. In (Noel, Jajodia, 2005) the common approach, attack graph visualization and the tool for topological vulnerability analysis are considered.

In the paper we try to develop *a new approach to security evaluation based on comprehensive simulation of malefactor's actions, construction of attack graphs and computation of different security metrics*. The main difference of offered approach from examined ones consists in the way of simulating attacks (we use a multi-level model of attack scenarios) and applying constructed attack graphs (for different locations of malefactors) for determining a family of security metrics and comprehensive evaluation of security properties. Security analysis system (SAS) based on the offered approach is intended for usage at different stages of computer network life cycle. The results of security analysis are as follows: (1) vulnerabilities detected; (2) routes (graphs) of possible attacks; (3)

bottlenecks in network; (4) different security metrics, which can be used for general security level evaluation of computer network (system) and its components. Obtained results allow producing the valid recommendations for elimination of detected bottlenecks and strengthening common security level. After modification, if it is necessary, the user repeats the process of security evaluation. The work is organized as follows. *Section 2* defines the model of attack scenarios and considers the common attack graph generated. *Section 3* specifies security metrics and the procedure for evaluating a common security level. *Section 4* presents the security analysis system implemented. Conclusion surveys main work results and future research.

## 2 ATTACK GRAPH

Our model of attack scenarios is hierarchical and contains three levels: integrated, script and actions.

*Integrated level* determines high-level purposes (threats) of the security analysis and attack objects. Integrated level allows to coordinate several scenarios performed by one or several malefactors.

*Script level* takes into account initial malefactor's qualification and knowledge about computer network, defines attack object and attack purpose (for example, "OS determining", "denial of service", etc.). Script level sets script stages used, including reconnaissance, penetration (initial access to the host), privileges escalation, threat realization, traces hiding and backdoors creation. The lower scenario elements serve for detailing of these phases.

The *low level* of attack model describes low-level malefactor's actions and exploits.

*The algorithm of generating the common attack graph* is based on the attack scenarios model developed. It is intended for creation of attack graph which describes all possible routes of attack actions in view of malefactor's initial position, skill level, network configuration and used security policy. The algorithm of generating common attack graph is based on realization of the following action sequence: (1) actions which are intended for malefactor's movement from one host to another; (2) reconnaissance actions for detection of "live" hosts; (3) reconnaissance scenarios for detected hosts; (4) attack actions based on vulnerabilities and actions of ordinary users.

All *objects of attack graph* are divided into two groups: base objects and combined objects. *Base objects* define the graph vertexes. They are linked to each other by edges for forming different sequences

of malefactor's actions. *Combined objects* are built on the basis of linking the elementary objects by arcs. Objects of types "host" and "attack action" are base (elementary) objects. Set of objects "*hosts*" includes all hosts discovered and attacked by malefactor. Set of objects "*attack action*" contains all distinguishable actions of malefactor.

All *attack actions* are divided into the following classes: Reconnaissance actions; Preparatory actions (within the limits of malefactor's privileges) used for creation of conditions needed for other attack actions; Actions to gain the privileges of local user and of administrator; Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability violation.

Objects of types "route", "threat" and "graph" are *combined objects*. *Route* is a collection of linked vertexes of general attack graph (hosts and attack actions), first of which represents a host (initial malefactor's position) and last has no outgoing arcs. *Threat* is a set of various attack routes having identical initial and final vertexes. We classify *threats* as follows: (1) *Primary threats* – threats of confidentiality, integrity and availability violation; (2) *Additional threats* – threats of gaining information about host or network, gaining privileges of local user and of administrator. *Graph* is integration of all threats.

### 3 METRICS

About 150 different metrics were constructed on the basis of common attack graph. *According to division of attack graph objects* the security metrics can be divided into metrics of base objects (hosts and attack actions) and ones of combined objects (routes; threats; attack graph). *According to the order of calculation* we differentiate primary and secondary metrics. Primary metrics are defined from attack graph; secondary ones are calculated on the basis of primary. All security metrics are divided into basic and auxiliary according to whether they are used for evaluating a common security level. *Basic security metrics* are directly used for the evaluation. *Auxiliary security metrics* serve for building detailed picture of network security and are required, for example, for detecting bottlenecks and generating instructions on security strengthening.

We define the following metrics as basic ones: Criticality level of host  $h$  ( $Criticality(h)$ ); criticality level of attack action  $a$  ( $Severity(a)$ ); Damage level caused by attack action and taking into account the criticality level of host ( $Mortality(a, h)$ ); damage level of route  $S$  and threat  $T$  ( $Mortality(S)$  and

$Mortality(T)$ ); "Access complexity" of attack action  $a$ , route  $S$  and threat  $T$  ( $AccessComplexity(a)$ ,  $AccessComplexity(S)$ ,  $AccessComplexity(T)$ ); Admissibility of threat realization ( $Realization(T)$ ); Risk level of threat  $T$  ( $RiskLevel(T)$ ); General security level of computer network ( $SecurityLevel$ ).

Some security metrics are calculated on the basis of standard *Common Vulnerability Scoring System* (CVSS, 2006). CVSS metrics are divided into base, temporal and environmental. *Base indexes* define *criticality* of vulnerability. *Temporal indexes* determine *urgency* of vulnerability at the given time. *Environmental indexes* should be used for priorities arrangement at time of generating plans of vulnerabilities elimination. CVSS metrics of attack actions can be obtained from external databases of vulnerabilities, for example, NVD (NVD, 2006).

The offered technique for qualitative express-assessment of security level contains the following stages: (1) Calculation of security metrics of basic and combined objects; (2) Estimation of qualitative assessments of risk level for all threats; (3) Security level evaluation on basis of risk levels of all threats.

$Criticality(h)$  is determined by designer (or administrator) using three level scale (*High, Medium, Low*) according to the purpose of given host and its functions.  $Criticality(h)$  is determined in dependence from the security policy used. For example, if accessibility is the main factor, the maximum criticality level is defined for those hosts, incorrect functioning of which leads to impossibility of using network resources by legitimate users.

$Severity(a)$  is calculated with usage of CVSS index "BaseScore" (NVD-Severity, 2006) also by applying three level scale (High, Medium, Low).

$Mortality(a, h)$  is calculated taking into account the criticality levels of host and action.

$Mortality(T)$  is defined by the *damage level* of the latest attack action of one of the threat routes. The values of  $Mortality(T)$  are as follows: *High* – stopping of critical subdivisions of organization which leads to essential financial losses; *Medium* – short-term stopping of critical processes or systems which leads to limited financial losses in one subdivision of organization; *Low* – the damage do not cause the essential financial losses.

However, it is possible that a malefactor at threat realization causes the greater damage than damage calculated by latest attack action of the threat. Then it is necessary to define the following metrics: maximum damage level of route  $S$  and threat  $T$ . These metrics can be calculated as follows:

$$Mortality^{max}(S) = \max_i (Mortality(a_i, h_i)), i \in [1, N_S], a_i \in S,$$

$$Mortality^{max}(T) = \max_i (Mortality(S_i)), i \in [1, N_T], S_i \in T,$$

where  $N_S$  – length of route (quantity of attack actions in the route);  $N_T$  – quantity of routes in the threat  $T$ .

For calculation of *threat risk level* it is necessary to evaluate the threat realization admissibility ( $Realization(T)$ ) and to use the FRAP technique (FRAP6 2006) taking into account threat damage level  $Mortality(T)$  obtained earlier.

“Access Complexity” index of CVSS ( $AccessComplexity(a)$ , where  $a$  – attack action) is used for computation of threat realization admissibility. This index belongs to a group of base indexes and is specified for each attack action. The possible values of this index are: *High* – there are specific conditions for vulnerability usage (attack action realization), for example a specific time or network service configuration, interaction with human, etc; *Low* – there are no specific conditions, i.e. the vulnerability is always exploitable.

Then,  $AccessComplexity(S)$  is *High* if  $\exists k \in [1, N]$ :  $AccessComplexity(a_k) = High$  and is *Low* if  $\forall k \in [1, N]$ :  $AccessComplexity(a_k) = Low$ , where  $S = \{a_i\}_{i=1}^N$  – attack scenario (route);  $N$  – length of route (quantity of attack actions).

$AccessComplexity(T)$  (threat  $T$  represented as a set of various attack routes having the same initial and final vertexes) is *Low* if  $\exists k \in [1, N_S]$ :  $AccessComplexity(S_k) = Low$  and is *High* if  $\forall k \in [1, N_S]$ :  $AccessComplexity(S_k) = High$ , where  $T = \{S_k\}_{k=1}^{N_S}$  – threat;  $N_S$  – quantity of different routes of threat  $T$ ;  $S_k = \{a_i\}_{i=1}^{N_k}$  – attack scenario (route);  $N_k$  – quantity of attack actions in the route.

Then *admissibility of threat  $T$  realization* is *High* if  $AccessComplexity(T) = Low$  and is *Low* if  $AccessComplexity(T) = High$ .

*Threat risk level* ( $RiskLevel(T)$ ) can be evaluated according to  $Realization(T)$  and  $Severity(T)$ . Threat risk level can be interpreted as follows: **Level A** – the actions concerned with risk (for example, using a new security software or eliminating detected vulnerabilities) should be fulfilled immediately; **Level B** – the actions concerned with risk should be undertaken; **Level C** – monitoring a situation is required (possibly, it is not required to undertake additional actions); **Level D** – additional actions are not required.

*SecurityLevel* is defined in the following way:

$$SecurityLevel = \begin{cases} Green, \forall i \in [1, N_T] RiskLevel(T_i) = D \\ Yellow, \forall i \in [1, N_T] RiskLevel(T_i) \leq C \\ Orange, \forall i \in [1, N_T] RiskLevel(T_i) \leq B \\ Red, \exists i \in [1, N_T] : RiskLevel(T_i) = A \end{cases}$$

where  $D < C < B < A$ ,  $N_T$  – the quantity of all threats.

## 4 IMPLEMENTATION

Based on the suggested approach the *security analysis system (SAS)* has been implemented. The network model which SAS uses at the design stage is based on network configuration expressed in *System Description Language (SDL)* and security policy in *Security Policy Language (SPL)* (Positif, 2006). At the exploitation stage the network model is created on the basis of data collected from network. Let us consider the main SAS components.

*Data Repository* contains the data base (DB) of network configuration and security policy (*NetworkModel*), DB of malefactor’s conception on configuration and security policy, and the database of actions (*Attacks*). The component *NetworkModel* contains information about network architecture and its parameters (for example, types and versions of operating systems, applications, opened ports, etc.) and rules which describe the security policy. The component *Attacks* consists of DB of actions which uses vulnerabilities and DB of usual user actions.

*ModelInitializer* converts the information about network configuration and security policy into internal representation. *DataControl* detects incorrect or undefined data which are necessary for evaluating security level. For example, the user can make a mistake in the name of a service or specify that port 21 is opened, but do not specify what application serves the requests on this port.

*GraphBuilder* builds attack graph by simulating malefactor’s actions on the base of information about available attack actions, network configuration and used security policy. This module sets up security metrics of elementary objects in attack graph vertexes. On the basis of these metrics, *GraphAnalyzer* calculates the metrics of combined objects. *ReportGenerator* shows vulnerabilities detected by SAS, represents bottlenecks and recommendations on strengthening security level. *InformCollector* is used for collection of information derived from host software agents, representation of derived information using SDL and SPL and transferring this data to the *ModelInitializer*. *DataUpdater* downloads the XML specifications of vulnerabilities from open vulnerability database and translates them into the database of attack actions.

Figure 1 shows the SAS user interface. It is divided into four basic parts: (1) The SAS *main menu*; (2) The *top area of the main window* with the following tabs: “Analyzed Network Model” – representation of network model; “Malefactor’s Network Model” – malefactor’s conception on configuration and security policy at the given attack




Figure 1: SAS user interface.

stage; “General Attack Graph” – general attack graph representation; (3) The *bottom area of the main window* which displays the SAS log, vulnerable hosts and revealed vulnerabilities, security metrics, requirements and reports; (4) Management buttons area.

Let us consider SAS operation for the simple test network depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Structure of test network.

During construction of attack graph there are the following main changes in malefactor’s conception about network (depicted in step-by-step mode – see Figure 3):

- (1) After executing the “ping” attack (according to rules of traffic routing), malefactor gets to know about host “Server” (Figure 3,a);
- (2) Malefactor executes attack action which uses the vulnerability in ftp service and allows to gain

administrator privileges (host “Server” is highlighted by red) (Figure 3,b);

(3) Malefactor uses gained privileges to get all information about “Server”. This information allows him to understand that “Server” is connected to another switch (the port forwarding is used in the network). Hence, it is advantageous for malefactor to change location since he gets the access to other network segment. Figure 3,c shows a breach between hosts which appears because malefactor does not know through what host (router) the network packets move from his host (“Malefactor”) to host “Server”;

(4) Malefactor moves to the host “Server”, executes the “ping” action and gets to know about a set of hosts which he tries to attack sequentially (Figure 3,d).

The main results of security analysis for this example are as follows: (1) detected vulnerabilities; (2) values of security metrics (for example, quantity of attack routes which are passing through “Server”); (3) reports on the status of basic security aspects including instructions on security level increase.

Security analysis showed that the network security level is red. Next actions of user are as follows: (1) elimination of detected vulnerabilities and bottlenecks by updating network configuration and security policy; (2) repeated security analysis.




Figure 3: Malefactor’s representations about the network.

## 5 CONCLUSION

The paper offered the approach and software tool for security analysis of computer networks. The approach possesses the following peculiarities: (1) Usage of integrated family of different models based on expert knowledge, including malefactor's models, multilevel models of attack scenarios, building attack graph, security metrics computation and security level evaluation; (2) Taking into account diversity of malefactor's positions, intentions and experience levels; (3) Usage (during construction of common attack graph) not only of the parameters of computer network configuration, but the rules of security policy used; possibility of estimating the influence of different configuration and policy data on the security level value; (4) Taking into account not only attack actions (which use vulnerabilities), but the common actions of legitimate users and reconnaissance actions; (5) Possibility of investigating various threats for different network resources; (6) Possibility of detection of bottlenecks (hosts and applications responsible for the most serious attack actions, routes and threats); (7) Possibility of querying the system in the "what-if" way, for example, how the general security level will change if the certain parameter of network configuration or security policy is changed or information about new vulnerability is added; (8) Usage of updated vulnerabilities databases (for example, Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB 2006)); (9) Usage of widespread CVSS approach (CVSS, 2006); (10) Usage of qualitative techniques of risk analysis (in particular, modified techniques of evaluating attack criticality of SANS/GIAC and FRAP (FRAP, 2006).

The future research will be devoted to comprehensive experimental assessment of offered approach and improving the models of computer attacks and security level evaluation.

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