




Четвертая международная научная школа
"Управление инцидентами и противодействие целевым кибер-
физическими атакам в распределенных крупномасштабных
критически важных системах"

Атаки истощения ресурсов на киберфизические системы

Десницкий В.А.


СПИИРАН

Киберфизические системы




КФС – интеграция коммуникационных & вычислительных ресурсов в процессы физического управления


Области приложения КФС



Примеры КФС: дамба



Примеры КФС: сеть кризисного управления




АИЭ-атаки

- Атаки истощения энергоресурсов (АИЭ)



- Автономное функционирование
- Беспроводные коммуникации

Особенности АИЭ



Работы в предметной области

- Analysis of misusing mobile device batteries [Shin, et al., 2009], [Moyers, et al., 2010], etc.
- Energy resource exhaustion attacks in WSN, inc. *replay attacks, broadcast attacks*, etc. [Boubiche, et al., 2013], [Krishnan]
- Exploiting *MMS vulnerability* in battery exhaustion attack ERE attacks of mobile devices [Racic, et al., 2006]
- *Jamming attacks* [Karpagam, et al., 2013], [Periyanayagi, et al., 2011], etc.
- Denial-of-Sleep attacks in WSN, incl. *collision attack, overhearing attack, control packet overhead attack*, etc. [Goudar, et al., 2015], [Capossele, et al., 2016], etc.
- *Vampire attacks* in WSN [Farzana, et al., 2014]

Модели нарушителя

Classification of intruder access type		(Rae, et al.,03)
Type ₀	- no access (social engineering)	
Type ₁	- no direct access (TCP/IP based attacks from Internet)	
Type ₂	- remote access (Wi-Fi, IR, Bluetooth, etc.)	
Type ₃	- outward access (direct access to RS-232, I2C, etc.)	
Type ₄	- full access (tamper with microchip)	

Classification of intruder capability levels		(Abraham, et al.,91)
Level ₁	- public accessed tools, well-known vulnerabilities	
Level ₂	- specialized tools, previously unknown vulnerabilities	
Level ₃	- group of intruders level 2 (unlimited resources)	

Типы АИЭ

- Атаки

Forced waking of a sleeping device (Denial-of-Sleep)

Growth of wireless traffic

Electromagnetic jamming

Misuse of a device

Атаки типа Denial-of-Sleep

Goal	Reducing the time of a sleep mode
Features	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Presence of idle states of small energy consumption.2. Using energy consuming wireless interfaces such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc.3. Attack category <<i>Types₁</i>& <i>Type₂</i>, <i>Level₁</i> & above>
Actions	<i>idle mode → active mode</i>
Resources and possibilities	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Superficial knowledge of Linux. Downloading and installing typical software. Capabilities of reproducing manuals.2. Minimal time for deployment of a new attacking device is required after the precursive software and hardware preparation.3. Typical laptop/single-board computer.4. Rooted Android.
Conclusions	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Indirect impact on the device (i.e. wirelessly).2. Attack distance - wave frequencies and the power of the antenna of the intruder.3. No need for an intruder to be authorized => complicates effective protection

Атаки увеличения беспроводного трафика

Goal	Increasing amounts of income/outcome data & decreasing their speed
Features	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Typically devices transmit data not permanently. An attacker is to enlarge amounts of data transmitted and time of the transmission.2. Attack category <i><Types₁&Type₂, Level₁&above></i>.
Actions	Intruder logs in to the device and starts messaging. To defeat authorization the one breaks the key or makes a replay attack by some past legitimate traffic.
Resources and possibilities	Basic knowledge on the target system. Typical laptop/single-board computer. Rooted Android.
Conclusions	Indirect impact (i.e. wirelessly). Attack distance - wave frequencies and the antenna of the intruder.

Jamming-атаки

Goal	To force the device to increase the signal power during the communication.
Features	Normally wireless modules try to transmit at the minimum power to reduce energy costs. Attack category < <i>Type₂</i> , <i>Level₂&above</i> >.
Actions	Electromagnetic noising on wireless data transmission channels.
Resources and possibilities	Tools to affect wireless channels. Location in a short distance from the device.
Conclusions	Indirect impact (i.e. wirelessly). Attack distance - wave frequencies and the antenna of the intruder.

Атаки неправильного использования

Goal	Waste energy by forcing the device to run some unnecessary functions.
Features	Attack category $\langle Type_0 - Type_4, Level_1 \& above \rangle$.
Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- extra CPU load,- access to energy consuming memory,- packet transmission via communication channels,- multiple launch of applications,- breaking/bypass optimizations,- non-typical use of the software,- remote desktop session, etc.
Resources and possibilities	Penetration skills for direct/remote access to the device and run malware on it.
Conclusions	The attack assumes the deepest affection of the intruder to the device.

Эксперименты

- Вычисление эффективности АИЭ
- Proof-of-the concept

Case study 1

Smartphone LG Nexus 5



Case study 2

Wireless XBee module s2



Denial-of-Sleep attack



measurements

Case study 1: моделирование атак типа Denial-of-Sleep

root@kali: ~


File Edit View Search Terminal Help

```
root@kali:~# bluetoothctl
[NEW] Controller E0:B9:A5:9C:BE:E6 kali [default]
[NEW] Device 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 88-C9-D0-24-D7-48
[NEW] Device 30:10:B3:1C:4D:9F MAKS
[NEW] Device 90:21:81:E1:00:DF 90-21-81-E1-00-DF
[bluetooth]# scan on
Discovery started
[CHG] Controller E0:B9:A5:9C:BE:E6 Discovering: yes
[CHG] Device 30:10:B3:1C:4D:9F RSSI: -83
[CHG] Device 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 RSSI: -57
[bluetooth]# quit
[DEL] Controller E0:B9:A5:9C:BE:E6 kali [default]
root@kali:~# l2ping -s 600 -f 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48
Ping: 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 from E0:B9:A5:9C:BE:E6 (data size 600) ...
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 0 time 12.43ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 1 time 11.22ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 2 time 8.72ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 3 time 8.70ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 4 time 8.74ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 5 time 10.02ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 6 time 8.72ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 7 time 8.74ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 8 time 12.46ms
0 bytes from 88:C9:D0:24:D7:48 id 9 time 8.78ms
```

Bluetoothctl –
device detection
& getting data

L2ping – series of
ping requests

Case study 1: анализ атаки




by reading *BatteryManager.EXTRA_LEVEL*

Эффективность атаки:

$$E = \frac{\text{delta}(Q_A)}{\text{delta}(Q_N)} = 3.5$$

Case study 2: моделирование атаки типа Denial-of-Sleep



by hardware sensor of the current (MAX471)

Case study 2: анализ атаки

XBee config. parameters:

SM = 4 (cyclic sleep mode)

ST = 1000 msec (time before sleep)

SP = 10000 msec (cyclic Sleep Period)

Time gap, msec	0 – 1000	1000 – 11000
I_{IDLE} , mA	45	8
I_{ATTACK} , mA	51	51

Эффективность атаки:

$$E = I_{ATTACK} \cdot (t_2 - t_1) / \int_{t_1}^{t_2} I_{IDLE}(t) dt = 4.488$$

mean value

Заключение

- Выводы
 - Разработана аналитическая модель АИЭ
 - Проведены эксперименты на 2 примерах приложения
 - Вычислена эффективность атак типа Denial-of-Sleep
 - Продемонстрирована выполнимость АИЭ

Контакты

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